Nuclear & Radiological Risk Governance – a critical exploration of theory and practice.
Gaston Meskens (SCK CEN)
The overall aim of this part is to provide better insight into the complexity of nuclear risk governance and to discuss as well the moral foundations for risk governance as the practical implications for research and policy. The course will start with basic reflections on risk perception and risk justification and will also discuss specific case studies in this respect. Based on these considerations, together with the students, a normative view on the ‘method of risk justification and governance’ in societal context (as compared to the occupational context) will be constructed. Consequently, this ‘normative view on method’ will be used to asses current understandings of radiological protection and safety culture (as outlined in existing recommendations and regulations). A last part will concentrate on existing and emerging advanced scientific methods (‘technology assessment’, ‘science & technology studies’, ‘mode-2 science’, ‘transdisciplinarity’, …) that would support a more deliberate dealing with risk governance in research and policy.
Fernand Vermeersch (UCL)
The course shall include a synthesis of the safety culture and integrated management systems points of view of the IAEA. Particular attention will be given to safety culture assessment, its pitfalls and its use in daily practice (case discussions). To anticipate the third part on Safeguards and Security, some discussion about the cultural aspects of safety and security will be presented. The organisational aspects of safety management as part of the management of the entire company within an integrated management system will be presented.
Nuclear Safeguards & Security.
Greet Janssens-Maenhout (UGent)
The legal background and the technical measures, necessary to guarantee peaceful use of nuclear energy are explained with a historical overview. The international and regional framework for inspectorates, their goals and detection tools are described, firstly for safeguards of nuclear material and secondly for non-proliferation of nuclear technology. The latter touches upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group and export control with dual-use list and trigger list. Nuclear security will be addressed with examples of detectors and radiation portal monitors used at border control.